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Abstract   
The paper explores the redistributive effect of classical horizontal inequities induced by 
agricultural support policy.  Within farm-type horizontal inequity (HI) is associated with 
differences in the level of support received by farms of a given type and level of pre-support 
income, whereas between farm-type HI arises from systematic differences in support levels 
between commodity regimes.  The overall redistributive effect of HI in Scottish agriculture is 
shown to be substantial, though systematic discrimination between farm types proves not to be 
the major cause.  By implication, agricultural policy is unsuited to targeting support to those 
farms capable of generating only low levels of income. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the main objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is ‘to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture’ (EU, 2002: Article 33).  However, the provision of 
support through the CAP is not determined on a means-tested basis but is contingent instead on 
current and/or historical levels of outputs and/or inputs.1  The use of indicators other than 
farmers’ incomes to target support may well be justified in terms of the attainment of the other 
objectives of the CAP, most notably to increase agricultural productivity and assure the 
availability of supplies, or purely in terms of administrative convenience.  But one likely 
consequence is the violation of the principle of horizontal equity, which states that equals should 
be treated equally.2  In particular, horizontal inequities may arise from systematic differences in 
levels of support between commodities, such that farmers with identical levels of pre-support 
income receive different levels of support conditional on farm type.  Moreover, even after 
controlling for both pre-support incomes and farm type, inequities may still arise from the 
heterogeneity of individual farms.  The focus of this paper is on the measurement of these 
between and within farm-type sources of classical horizontal inequity (HI).   
 The measurement of HI due to agricultural support programmes has received virtually no 
consideration in the agricultural economics literature in spite of the identification by OECD 
agricultural ministers (OECD, 1998) of equity and targeting as operational criteria for policy 
evaluation.  In particular, OECD (2003) focuses on vertical rather than horizontal equity issues, 
concluding that farm support measures do not change ‘the income distribution in any significant 
way’ with the bulk of support going ‘to farm households who do not need it’ (pp.7-8).  Variation 
in support levels across commodities in the European Union is reported to have ‘widened 
[average] income disparities between dairy and intensive livestock farms on the one hand and 
field crop and cattle farms on the other’ (p.30).   
 Allanson (2004) provides a characterisation of the overall redistributive effects of the CAP 
on Scottish farming incomes in terms of a vertical redistribution effect and a horizontal inequity 
component due to re-ranking.  This re-ranking approach identifies HI with the procedural 
unfairness manifest in changes in the ranking of farms between the pre-support and post-support 
                                                 
1 See Agra Informa (2005) for a comprehensive guide to the CAP. 
2  See Lambert (2001) for a discussion of this principle. 
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income distributions, which provides a sufficient but not necessary condition for the unequal 
treatment of equals (Rodriguez et al., 2004).  The adverse distributional effect of re-ranking is 
shown to have been of sufficient magnitude to more then offset the otherwise positive 
redistributive effect of the CAP in 1999/00.  It is also reported that the re-ranking effect for the 
agricultural sector as a whole is not consistently larger than those for individual farm types, 
which is taken to imply the importance of HI sources other than variation in support levels across 
commodities.  However the analytical framework employed in the study does not allow 
substantiation of this conjecture.   
 This paper draws on ideas contained in the work of Aronson et al. (1994) and Kakwani and 
Lambert (1999) on income taxation, to identify both the composition and overall level of 
classical HI in the provision of agricultural support.  In particular, within farm-type HI is 
identified with the dispersion of post-support incomes about a post-support income schedule 
estimated for each farm type as a non-parametric function of pre-support incomes.  Between 
farm type HI is then captured by the deviations of these post-support income schedules from a 
non-discriminatory schedule that is specified on the assumption that discrimination between farm 
types changes the distribution but not the average value of support at any given level of pre-
support income.  Finally, the overall level of classical HI is simply determined by the degree of 
dispersion of post-support incomes about the non- discriminatory schedule.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section introduces the approach that is 
used to identify classical horizontal inequity and considers the specification and estimation of the 
post-support income schedules for each farm type and the non-discriminatory support schedule.  
Section 3 presents an empirical illustration based on farm accounts data for Scottish agriculture 
in 1999/2000, the last full financial year before the foot-and-mouth outbreak.  The section first 
outlines the data issues involved in the construction of the distributions of pre-support and post-
support Scottish farming incomes, before presenting the empirical findings on the redistributive 
effect of horizontal inequities in the provision of agricultural support.  The final section offers a 
summary together with some brief concluding remarks on the policy implications of the 
empirical findings. 
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2.  Identification of classical horizontal inequity  
The provision of support through the CAP is complex and cannot credibly be represented by a 
single schedule applicable to all farms.  In particular, the CAP consists of a number of more or 
less separate ‘common market organisations’ or commodity regimes, with the eligibility for 
benefits within each regime typically determined by some combination of current and/or 
historical levels of output and/or inputs.3  This suggests that a better description of the level of 
support available through the CAP would consist of a number of distinct commodity support 
schedules that apply specifically to producers of those commodities (e.g. cereal growers, milk 
producers etc.).  However many farms produce more than one commodity and farm accounts 
data typically do not permit identification of the contribution of each to overall farming income 
due to the incomplete allocation of costs.  Accordingly, separate schedules are defined not for 
each producer group but for distinct sub-populations of farms producing more or less similar 
combinations of commodities (e.g. specialist cereal farms, dairy farms etc.). 
Consider a population of farms made up of an exhaustive set of K mutually exclusive farm 
types (k = 1,... K).  Let y=(y1,… yk,… yK), s=(s1,… sk,… sK) and x=(x1,… xk,… xK)  be the 
vectors of observations on post-support income, support and pre-support incomes, where yk, sk, 
and xk are constituent sub-vectors of observations on farms of type k (k = 1,….K).  Following the 
approach taken in Aronson et al. (1994), assume that the level of support received by farms of 
type k is given by the model:  
sk = fk(xk) + εk;     k = 1,….K  (1) 
such that their post-support incomes are determined by:  
yk  =  xk + sk  =  xk + fk(xk) + εk  ≡  gk(xk) + εk;     k = 1,….K    (2) 
where fk and gk are farm-type specific functions of the pre-support income level and the vector of 
‘disturbance terms’ εk is defined such that E[εk | xk] = 0.   
The assumption of a systematic relationship between support and pre-support income is 
plausible given that the levels of both are determined by levels of output and inputs.  However 
                                                 
3 Note that direct payments will remain linked to historical levels of production even after implementation of the 
most recent set of reforms (European Commission, 2003b) given that entitlement to the Single Farm Payment will 
be based on the average of direct payment receipts under the main subsidy schemes during the reference period 2000 
to 2002 with payments conditional on maintenance of the reference area in good agricultural and environmental 
condition. 
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the precise form of this relationship can not be specified given the nature and complexity of CAP 
commodity regimes.  Accordingly, fk and gk are simply assumed to be continuous, smooth 
functions, yielding a non-parametric model with only very weak constraints on its structure.  
Furthermore, the relationship is unlikely to hold exactly as farms of type k with identical pre-
support incomes may well differ in their eligibility for support as a result of differences in natural 
resource endowments, managerial ability and historical development.  The disturbance term 
allows for this heterogeneity within type k farms.  
The model of income support allows for the existence of two possible sources of classical 
horizontal inequity (HI).  First farms of type k with identical pre-support incomes may have 
different post-support incomes due to the disturbance term, with the degree of dispersion of post-
support incomes yk about gk(xk) reflecting the extent of within farm-type HI.  Only if εk = 0 will 
there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-support to post-support incomes for type k farms and 
hence no within farm-type HI.  Accordingly, the post-support income schedule gk(xk) can be 
identified as the vector of post-support incomes that the sub-population of type k farms would 
receive in the absence of within farm-type HI.  Note that the distribution of gk(xk)=E[yk | xk] will 
weakly Lorenz dominate that of yk , since the former may be obtained from the latter through a 
series of progressive, mean-preserving transfers.  Moreover, if h(x)=(g1(x1),… gk(xk),… gK(xK)) 
is defined as the vector of post-support incomes that the population of farms would receive in the 
absence of within-farm HI, then the distribution of h(x) will weakly Lorenz dominate that of y.  
However these dominance relations may not necessarily hold exactly in any finite sample of 
farms drawn from the population.   
The other potential source of classical horizontal inequity is due to systematic discrimination 
between farm types.  Different types of farm with identical pre-support incomes may have 
different expected post-support incomes as the post-support income schedules gk(xk) are type 
specific, with the scale of divergences between these schedules reflecting the extent of between 
farm-type HI.  Only if gk(xk)= g(xk) k∀ , and hence h(x)=g(x), will there be a one-to-one 
mapping from pre-support incomes to expected post-support incomes for all farms and hence no 
between farm-type HI.  The measurement of between farm-type HI requires the identification of 
a post-support income schedule h*(x) determining the post-support incomes that the whole 
population of farms could expect to receive in the absence of discrimination between farm types.  
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There is, however, no established theory to guide the specification of this schedule.4  One 
possible approach, in the manner of Kakwani and Lambert (1999), is to specify h*(x) on the 
assumption that discrimination between farm types changes the distribution but not the average 
value of support at any given level of pre-support income.  The stipulation that the condition 
holds at each level of pre-support income serves to maintain the vertical stance of the overall 
support schedule if the distributions of farms by pre-support income are not identical across farm 
types.  It follows that h*(x) will be a weighted sum of the post-support income schedules for the 
individual farm types: 
h*(x) = ∑
=
K
1k
wk(x) gk(x);        ∑
=
K
1k
wk(x) = 1 (3) 
where the weights wk(x) are locally determined by the relative frequencies of the farm types at 
any given pre-support income level, rather than being globally determined by the proportions of 
each farm type in the population.  Note that the distribution of h*(x) will (weakly) Lorenz 
dominate that of h(x) since h*(x) is a weighted average of the gk(x) schedules.   
Finally, the degree of dispersion of post-support incomes y about the non-discriminatory 
post-support income schedule h*(x) will reflect the total extent of classical HI in the provision of 
agricultural support.  Only if y=h*(x) will there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-support 
incomes to post-support incomes for all farms and hence no HI.  More generally, total classical 
HI will equal the sum of between and within farm-type classical HI.   
 
Estimation of post-support income schedules 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to estimate the post-support income schedules in (2), 
from a sample consisting of nk population-weighted observations on pre-support and post-
support incomes for each farm type.  The estimation of these schedules implicitly resolves the 
identification problem inherent in classical approaches to the measurement of HI in the absence 
of observations on exact pre-support income equals.  The choice of a non-parametric technique 
for the purpose gets round the need to impose any parametric assumptions on the functional form 
of the gk(xk) schedules. 
                                                 
4 The problem is analogous to that encountered in the determination of wage discrimination using Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition techniques.  See Neumark (1988) for discussion. 
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In an interesting paper, Rodriguez et al. (2004) advocate the use of the class of bi-stochastic 
non-parametric estimators to estimate HI-free distributions.  Given the post-support income 
vector yk  then kgˆ (xk) = Wyk , where W is a bistochastic weight matrix
5 whose elements are solely 
determined by the pre-support income vector xk.  Thus the close-equals approach of Aronson et 
al. (1994; see also Lambert and Ramos, 1997; Kakwani and Lambert, 1999; van der Ven et al., 
2001) is interpreted as a special case of the estimator based on the regressogram (Tukey, 1947), 
where kgˆ (xk) is given as the (weighted) average of the values taken by yk  for which the 
corresponding values of xk fall into disjoint income classes (see Härdle, 1990).  This generates a 
discontinuous step function which may conceal features of the true schedule that are finer than 
the chosen width of the income classes.  Rodriguez et al. (2004) propose instead the use of a 
bistochastic kernel estimator based on a modification of the classic Nadaraya-Watson (NW) 
estimator (see Härdle, 1990).  This entails a two-stage procedure in which the NW estimator is 
first used to generate a smooth function whose value for each observation i in the sample is given 
as the (weighted) average of the values taken by yk  for which the corresponding values of xk lie 
in the neighbourhood of xki.  The final estimate kgˆ (xk) is then derived by normalising the NW 
weights matrix so as to obtain a bistochastic matrix W.   
Rodriguez et al. (2004) argue that the main attraction of the use of bistochastic non-
parametric estimators is that kgˆ (xk) will weakly Lorenz dominate yk, implying that the 
elimination of classical HI must result in a reduction in inequality as measured by any S-convex 
inequality measure.  However the imposition of this restriction is inappropriate given that the 
Lorenz dominance of the classical HI-free distribution is only an asymptotic property of the 
model and need not necessarily hold exactly in any particular sample.  As a result, bistochastic 
non-parametric estimators will be biased in finite samples since they must satisfy:  
∑
=
j
1i
kgˆ (xki) ≥ ∑
=
j
1i
 yki;   j=1,… nk;   k=1,…K (4) 
where the observations are arranged in ascending order of post-support incomes.  In particular, it 
can be seen that the predicted income of the farm with the lowest post-support income in the 
sample can not be less than the observed value.   
                                                 
5 A bistochastic matrix is a square matrix in which all elements are non-negative and all rows and columns sum to 
one. 
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More generally, the estimation of gk(xki)=E[yk | xk=xki] as some local average of the 
weighted observations on yk  in the neighbourhood of xki may be unduly restrictive.  In particular, 
Hastie and Loader (1993) show that the NW estimator will generate biased estimates if the slope 
of gk(xki) is non-zero and the spacing of sample observations on pre-support incomes is not 
uniform.  Bias is also a problem at the boundary of the predictor space where the kernel 
neighbourhood is asymmetric.  To overcome these problems, Hastie and Loader (1993) 
recommend the use of local regression techniques that fit a low-order polynomial rather than a 
constant to the data in the neighbourhood of any value of xk, with the additional advantage of 
providing estimates of the derivatives of gk(xk) up to the specified order.   
In this paper, the variable span smoother of Sasieni (1998), which fits a local linear 
regression to the population-weighted observations in the neighbourhood of each data point in 
the sample, is used to estimate the gk(xk) schedules.  The number of observations used to fit the 
model at each data point is determined by the variable span of the smoother, which is calculated 
by initially choosing the span at each data point that minimises the cross validated mean squared 
prediction error (Härdle, 1990) and then smoothing the resultant series of values.  The smoother 
may be expected to provide a reasonable approximation to gk(xk) so long as the curvature of the 
unknown schedule is not excessive (Hastie and Loader, 1993).  Like the bi-stochastic non-
parametric estimator of Rodriguez et al. (2004), the fitted schedule kgˆ (xk) is a weighted sum of 
the observations on yk , but the weights need not be non-negative and can not therefore be 
interpreted as probabilities.   
The second step in the estimation procedure is to estimate (3) to obtain the non-
discriminatory post-support income schedule.  One approach is to use equation (3) to calculate 
h*(x) from the estimates of the post-support income schedules, kgˆ (xk), and kernel density 
estimates of the weight functions wk(xk) (see Kakwani and Lambert, 1999).  However, reliable 
estimates of the weight functions could not be obtained given the limited number of observations 
on each farm type and the resultant sparseness of the data over the observed range of pre-support 
income levels.  An alternative approach was therefore adopted in which h*(x) was directly 
estimated using the same local regression technique as was used to estimate the post-support 
income schedules gk(xk), but applied to the pooled sample of weighted observations.  Thus the 
predicted level of non-discriminatory post-support income at any given level of pre-support 
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income will automatically reflect the farm type composition of the weighted sample in the 
neighbourhood of that point.  
 
3.  Horizontal inequity in the provision of agricultural support in Scotland, 1999/00 
To measure the extent of horizontal inequities in the provision of agricultural support in 
Scotland, the distribution of farms by both pre-support and post-support farming income is 
constructed using individual farm record data extracted from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey 
(FAS) for 1999/00 and raising factors calculated from the June Agricultural Census returns on 
the distribution of agricultural holdings in Scotland by type of farming and size of business in 
1999.  The FAS is a representative survey of about 500 full-time commercial farms carried out 
each year on behalf of the Scottish Executive (SEERAD, 2001).6  It provides a wide range of 
physical and financial data, including detailed information on crop areas, livestock numbers, 
quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and costs, which allows for the identification of 
policy benefits.  Given a population of around 17,500 full-time farms in Scotland, the sampling 
fraction for each farm size and type is approximately 3 per cent.   
Post-support income is measured by Family Farm Income (FFI), which represents the return 
to the farm’s own capital and all unpaid labour (farmers and spouses, non-principal partners and 
directors and their spouses and family workers) based on the actual tenure and indebtedness of 
the farm business.  FFI is thus a measure of farm business income with the distribution of FFI 
per holding providing ‘an important guide to the existence and locations of holdings generating 
small amounts of income for their occupiers’ (Hill, 1991: 43).  The analysis is conducted at the 
farm level rather than per unit of unpaid labour because of doubts concerning the relevance and 
reliability of data on family labour input in the UK context.7  The FAS does not provide 
sufficient information on either non-farm sources of farm household income or farm household 
composition to support a broader analysis of the distributional impact of the CAP on the overall 
welfare of the agricultural community.   
                                                 
6 The sampling frame excludes very small farms (less than 8 Economic Size Units (ESU)), very large specialist 
livestock units (greater than 200 ESU), and certain minor farm types. 
7  See Hill (1991) for further discussion. 
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Pre-support income is defined as FFI less that part of gross policy transfers that is estimated 
to accrue to farm occupiers as owners of factors of agricultural production.  This approach 
recognises that farm occupiers may not be the ultimate beneficiaries of farm support programmes 
(Floyd, 1965) and, in particular, allows for the effective incidence of support to vary depending 
on the way in which that support is provided (see OECD, 2003: Part II).  The analysis thereby 
serves to identify the contribution of support to the inequality of post-support farming incomes, 
but it does not allow for the impact of agricultural policy on the distribution of pre-support 
incomes.  To do so would require a model of the impact on individual farm incomes of 
adjustments in both farm production choices and the state of agricultural input and output 
markets in response to agricultural policy changes.  However it seems unlikely that the results of 
such an equilibrium displacement modelling exercise would be robust given the magnitude of the 
changes that would be entailed by the complete abolition of support for agriculture (Gardner, 
1987).  
Three types of policy instrument are identified in the analysis.  First, with respect to market 
price support measures, estimates are taken from the OECD PSE database (OECD, 2001) of the 
gap between the EU domestic market and border prices for the main agricultural commodities, 
measured at the farmgate level.  These estimates are adjusted to reflect the difference between 
United Kingdom (UK) and EU average producer prices and then used to calculate the impact of 
market price support in terms of inflating both the value (net of direct payments, grants and other 
subsidies) of observed output quantities and the cost of purchased feed and seed inputs.  Second, 
direct payments are explicitly identified in the FAS and cover payments under the various CAP 
commodity regimes, voluntary set-aside schemes and the UK Hill Livestock Compensatory 
Allowances scheme.  But account is also taken of the implicit loss in revenues resulting from the 
obligatory set-aside requirements under the Arable Area Payments scheme (AAPS) in 
calculating the net value of these payments.  Third, the value of other grants and subsidies 
includes all other payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent improvements.  
The net economic benefit to farmers of these transfers will depend on the extent to which the 
transfers result in increased returns to the farm-owned factors of production, including 
management, and hence in increased farming incomes.  The effect on farming income of a unit 
increase in output revenues, whether due to market price support, output payments or a reduction 
in set-aside requirements, is estimated as the combined cost share of the farm-owned factors of 
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production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, grants or subsidies to individual 
inputs (i.e. land and livestock) is simply calculated as the farm-owned share of those inputs.  
Estimates of factor cost shares are obtained on the assumption that Scottish agriculture may be 
characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting constant returns 
to scale.  Allowing for fixed farm-specific and year-specific effects, the parameters of the Cobb-
Douglas production function are estimated from an unbalanced panel of observations formed 
from the FAS samples for 1995/96 through 1999/00 (Roberts et al., 2002).  This yields shares for 
total labour, land and buildings, livestock capital, and all other purchased inputs of 15.4%, 9.2%, 
8.6%, and 41.5% respectively.  With these attributable costs accounting for 74.8% of total 
revenue, the residual 25.2% is identified as the return to the farmer’s (fixed) management input.  
Farm-owned shares of factors of production are derived for each farm in the FAS sample, with 
80.7% of labour, 58.8% of land and buildings and 100% of livestock capital being supplied on 
average by farm occupiers in 1999/00.  Hence the average net benefit to farmers of an extra £1 of 
market price support or output-related payments; AAPS or other area-related payments; livestock 
headage payments, subsidies or grants; and purchased input subsidies would have been £0.517, 
£0.588, £1 and £0 respectively.  
 
Empirical findings 
The first column of figures in Table 1 presents weighted summary statistics for Scottish 
agriculture in 1999/00.  In that year, the average level of FFI per farm was just £12065 in spite of 
market price support worth £14335, (net) direct payments of £23918 and other grants and 
subsidies totalling £2262.  In practice farmers do not receive the full benefit of these transfers 
due to leakages to other owners of factors of production, so the total impact of agricultural 
support on average family farm income is predicted to have been £30373 rather than £40516.  
Even so, pre-support FFI would have been −£18308 on average with nearly 90 per cent of farms 
recording losses.  These results highlight the chronic dependence of farming on state aid.  
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Table 1.  Weighted summary statistics by farm type 1999/2000  
Farm Type All Cereals
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle 
Mixed 
Cattle & 
Sheep Mixed
Number of observations  498 26 59 71 62 107 105 68
% of raised sample  17.2% 12.4% 11.2% 10.1% 20.5% 16.4% 12.2%
Farm business size (ESU/farm) 63.5 53.5 116.8 95.9 34.4 43.8 52.2 65.9
(Post-support) FFI (£/farm) 12065 16680 14340 16721 4575 9972 8955 12852
% of farms with post-support FFI<0 22.5% 19.7% 17.6% 20.2% 38.1% 24.7% 20.3% 20.0%
Total transfers  (£/farm) 40516 38954 40937 55127 26715 35564 41453 47365
Of which due to:-  Market price support 14335 12729 11934 46922 2291 8773 9035 15532
(Net) direct payments 23918 22827 25863 7297 21599 25664 30296 29196
Other grants and subsidies 2262 3398 3139 908 2825 1127 2121 2637
Total net benefit to farmers (£/farm) 30373 26330 27532 32211 24444 30748 35104 35237
Of which due to:-  Market price 
support 
7695 6782 6439 25010 1309 4838 4835 8279
(Net) direct payments 20882 16271 18037 6643 21560 25102 29295 24458
Other grants and subsidies 1796 3277 3056 559 1574 808 974 2500
% of post-support FFI: 251.7% 157.9% 192.0% 192.6% 534.3% 308.4% 392.0% 274.2%
Pre-support FFI (£/farm) -18308 -9650 -13192 -15490 -19869 -20776 -26149 -22384
% of farms with pre-support FFI<0 87.2% 75.1% 69.2% 81.6% 97.0% 94.9% 96.1% 94.6%
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The remaining columns provide comparable information for each farm type, where seven 
distinct farm types have been identified on the basis of the distribution of standard gross margins 
across enterprises.8  Post-support income levels were highest on dairy and cereals farms, and 
lowest on specialist grazing livestock farms which are typically smaller businesses located in 
LFA areas.  Direct payments provided the main source of support for all farm types other than 
dairy farms, with the Arable Area Payment Scheme accounting for the bulk of payments on 
arable farms and the various headage payments doing likewise on sheep and cattle farms.  Total 
transfer and net benefit levels vary across farm types but not in such a way as to either 
consistently increase or decrease income disparities between farm types.  On the one hand, dairy 
farms received both the largest transfers and above average net benefits in spite of above average 
                                                 
8 The cereals, general cropping, dairy and mixed farm types are identical to the eponymous UK robust types. The 
specialist sheep farm type corresponds to EC type 441, specialist cattle to EC types 421 and 422 combined, and 
mixed cattle & sheep types to EC types 431, 432, 442 and 444 (as implemented in the UK) combined.   See MAFF 
(2001: Appendix B) for further description of the classification scheme. 
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pre-support income levels, while specialist sheep farms received the smallest transfers and net 
benefits in spite of the disadvantages of size and location faced by these holdings.  On the other 
hand, cereal farms received below average transfers and benefits, while mixed farms did 
comparatively well from the support system with net benefits sufficient to generate above 
average levels of post-support income in spite of large pre-support losses.  No clear picture 
therefore emerges with regard to farm type as to the vertical equity characteristics of the 
agricultural support system in Scotland. 
Table 2 presents the main findings of the paper on the redistributive effect of horizontal 
inequities in the provision of agricultural support.  Results are reported for a range of summary 
inequality measures so as to provide some indication of the robustness of the findings to the 
choice of measure.9  The coefficient of variation, relative mean deviation and Gini coefficient are 
all measures of relative inequality that are unaffected by equiproportionate (scale) changes in all 
incomes.10  The absolute Gini is an absolute inequality measure that is invariant to equal 
additions to all incomes rather than to scalar changes. 
The first four rows report the degree of inequality in the distributions of post-support income 
y, expected post-support income conditional upon farm type hˆ (x)=( 1gˆ (x1),… kgˆ (xk),… Kgˆ (xK)), 
non-discriminatory post-support income hˆ *(x) and pre-support income x, respectively.  The 
redistributive effects reported in the remainder of the table are derived from these measures.  
Thus the redistributive effect of within farm type classical HI is equal to the difference in 
inequality between the distributions of y and hˆ (x) for each measure, the between type effects are 
equal to the differences in measured inequality between hˆ (x) and hˆ *(x), while the overall 
redistributive effects equal the differences in inequality between y and hˆ *(x).  Finally, the net 
redistributive effect of the policy is calculated for each measure as the difference in inequality 
between the distributions of y and x.   
                                                 
9 See Cowell (1995) or Lambert (2001) for a general discussion of inequality measurement and the properties of the 
measures used in this study.  The choice of measures is constrained by the fact that many standard measures are 
simply undefined for negative incomes (see Amiel et al., 1996) 
10 Note though that the sign of these measures is determined by the sign of mean income.  Given that pre-support 
mean income is negative, the absolute values of these measures are reported for this case to allow direct 
comparability with other results. 
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Table 2.  Redistributive effects of agricultural support 
Inequality measure 
Gini 
Coefficient
Relative 
mean 
deviation
Coefficient 
of variation 
Absolute
Gini
Income concept  
Post-support income 0.907 1.230 39113 10946
Expected post-support income 0.467 0.655 18325 5758
Non-discriminatory post-support income 0.449 0.588 13117 5576
Pre-support income 0.613 0.844 27573 11214
Redistributive effects of classical HI  
Within farm-type   0.440 0.575 20788 5187
Between farm-type 0.018 0.067 5208 182
Overall  0.458 0.642 25996 5370
Net redistributive effect 0.295 0.386 11539 -268
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The first point to note is that the estimates of the redistributive effects of HI are all positive, 
implying that agricultural policy would have had a more equalising or less unequalising effect on 
the distribution of farming income were it not for horizontal inequities in the provision of 
agricultural support.  Thus the results for the three relative measures of inequality all suggest that 
agricultural policy would have reduced rather than increased relative inequality was it not for the 
presence of HI, given that the overall HI effect is larger than the net redistributive effect for each 
measure.  The results for the Absolute Gini suggest that agricultural policy had virtually no effect 
on absolute inequality, but it remains the case that the distribution of post-support income would 
have been less unequal in absolute terms but for HI.  All four sets of results imply that the overall 
redistributive effect of horizontal inequities in the provision of agricultural support was 
substantial, accounting for between one half and two thirds of measured inequality in the 
distribution of post-support farming incomes.  
For all the inequality measures, the redistributive effect of within farm-type HI far exceeds 
that of between farm-type HI.  The former arises from the dispersion of post-support incomes 
about the post-support income schedules 1gˆ (x1), … Kgˆ (xK), whereas the latter stems from 
systematic divergences between these schedules and the common, non-discriminatory schedule 
hˆ *(x).  The results therefore imply that factors other than farm type are dominant in determining 
differences in the levels of support received by individual farms with a particular level of pre-
support income.  Discrimination between farm types, due to the commodity organisation of 
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agricultural support, is a comparatively minor source of horizontal inequities in the provision of 
agricultural support in spite of the observed disparities in average support levels across farm 
types.   
 
4.  Conclusions 
The use of indicators other than farmers’ incomes to target agricultural support inevitably results 
in some degree of horizontal inequity (HI) due to the provision of different levels of support to 
farmers with identical pre-support incomes.  The paper proposes a methodology for the 
identification of both the composition and overall level of HI in the provision of agricultural 
support and provides estimates of the resultant redistributive effects for Scottish agriculture in 
1999/2000.  The empirical results reveal that the main source of HI was the weakness of the 
relationship of support to pre-support income levels within each farm type, rather than systematic 
discrimination between farm types.  The overall redistributive effect of HI is found to have been 
substantial in comparison to the degree of inequality in the distribution of post-support incomes.   
The imperfect targeting of support to farms has implications for the design of agricultural 
policy.  In particular, the European Commission (2002, 2003a) has recently sought to exploit the 
potential of direct aids to target support through proposals to modulate payments to individual 
farms.11  But the modulation of payments can do little to concentrate support on those farms 
capable of generating only low levels of income, given that levels of support differ so widely 
between farms with similar pre-support incomes.  Moreover, there seems little scope to improve 
the targeting of support through the rebalancing of support across commodity regimes given that 
systematic discrimination between farm types appears to be only a minor source of horizontal 
inequities.  One might therefore want to follow the OECD (2002: 11) in considering whether the 
general tax and social security system might not be better placed ‘to identify low incomes among 
agricultural households and ensure equal treatment vis-à-vis other classes of household.’ 
                                                 
11 The principle of ‘modulation’ refers to the transfer of money from direct payments to a wider range of rural 
development measures and involves the reduction in direct payments to which farmers would otherwise be entitled.  
EC (2002) includes proposals both for the exemption of direct payments below a certain level (the so-called 
‘franchise’) and for the imposition of a maximum threshold on payments per farm.  The latter proposal was replaced 
in EC (2003a) by a progressive modulation schedule in which the marginal, and hence also the average, modulation 
rate rose with the level of payments to the farm (the so-called ‘system of degression’). The franchise proposal forms 
part of the reform package agreed in July 2003 (EC, 2003b), but the possible introduction of degression has been 
deferred pending the need for financial discipline. 
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